Answering Questions on Mutual Intelligibility & Coherence
Discussing Mutual Intelligibility, Perception, Self-Definition, & Broader Implications
Dear Thinkers,
If you're reading me for the first time, welcome! And if you’ve been here before, thank you for being part of a growing conversation.
A few weeks ago, I published an essay asking whether intelligence can ever fully define itself. The response was amazing and electric. Many of you challenged core assumptions, raised good questions, and pushed the theory further than I imagined.
In this week’s piece, I want to continue the discussion. The questions we’ll explore touch topics like perception, the limits of self-knowledge, and what it means to think at all.
I noticed that many of the questions that I received seemed to have a similar base and/or a similar line of questioning. I agglomerated as many of them as possible into 10 major questions, that I classified into 4 categories, namely, questions pertaining to, ‘the foundations of the argument’, ‘perception’, ‘self-definition’, & ‘implications’.
If you haven’t already read my previous article, I highly recommend that you do. It's short and simple, and an important prerequisite for understanding the discussions that take place in this article.
If you prefer a quick visual explainer instead, you can checkout this video that I generated using Google’s NotebookLM.
I hope that my responses to the questions may better express my own understanding on matters related to coherence, agentic intelligence, and the inherent intelligibility of the universe. I trust that you, as a reader of my works, will not hold back on any genuine critique you may have on this theory, and I welcome any further line of inquiry that you would like to discuss on Mutual Intelligibility & Coherence. Thank you for taking the time to read this article. Let’s get started.
On the Foundations of the Argument
Question 1: You equate understanding with coherence, and coherence with conceptualisation. Isn’t that a bit circular? You say “to understand is to cohere, and to cohere is to conceptualise,” but doesn’t that just move the definition around instead of breaking it down?
Response: The reason why I define understanding as coherence rooted in conceptualisation is for the very reason of breaking from the circular loop that we have been traversing for decades.
Contemporary definitions of understanding in the philosophy of mind, are purely epistemic, in that they classify understanding by the virtue of the words we use to describe our understanding of a certain concept. Understanding is broadly defined as ‘grasping’ (which is dangerously ambiguous and circular). And this grasping is categorised as Explanatory (i.e., comprehending the why of something), Objectual (i.e., having a holistic grasp on the broader subject), or Propositional (i.e., understanding a specific fact or claim). All categorisations are nice and neat except that they don’t really define understanding in any way. They are more or less, classifying the levels of understanding and using the ‘grasp’ as a sort of scaffolding to hold it all together. This to me, is ambiguous and circular.
Conceptualisation -> Coherence / Understanding, is NOT a circular loop. It is a hierarchical dependency. Conceptualisation does not automatically infer coherence. Take for instance, the study of Quantum physics. We have different standard models for explaining the workings of Quantum mechanics. Each model can be thought of as a form of conceptualisation of Quantum mechanics. But does that mean that any model has actually led to us ‘understanding’ Quantum mechanics? The answer is no, because we do not cohere the inner workings of Quantum mechanics yet. We can conceptualise it to a certain degree, even manipulate it enough to generate computations with it. But our understanding of Quantum mechanics, even if we go by the contemporary definitions, would not qualify as explanatory, objectual or propositional. I stated in my article that “conceptualisation gives rise to coherence”. I never said “conceptualisation is coherence itself”.
Conceptualisation, therefore, can be thought of as step 1, in the process of generating coherence.
Question 2: You claim inherent intelligence within us interacts with inherent intelligibility in the world. Isn’t this smuggling in a metaphysical assumption that the world is inherently intelligible? How do you justify that claim against the possibility that intelligibility is something projected rather than discovered?
Response: This is an excellent question. How do we know that the universe is inherently intelligible? How do we know that this so-called intelligibility is not just a projection of our own intelligence upon a neutral universe?
We know that the universe is inherently intelligible because we as ‘intelligent agents’ operate, not as knowers, but as discoverers of the system. Our intelligence is focussed upon the discovery and synthesis of the workings of the universe. This is the very point of Hegel’s dialectic. The geist moves through us, we are not the geist in its entirety. Thesis gives rise to antithesis, and the friction between the two, creates synthesis and as a result, our understanding of the universe and our place within it makes progress. Simply put, if the universe wasn’t inherently intelligible, and all intelligence resided simply within the agent, then the agent's agency itself would be pointless. There would be nothing to discover nor would there be a need for discovery. The inherent intelligibility of the system, therefore, is not an assumption, it's an understanding. And by understanding I am strictly talking in terms of the functional aspect of coherence itself. I am NOT proposing a Logos or a neoplatonic theory.
On Perception
Question 3: You rightly bring up the Homunculus fallacy, but then you stop at infinite regress. If you dismiss the homunculus, how do you explain qualia without sneaking in a subtler homunculus, like “intelligence itself” acting as the perceiver? Isn’t that just the same regress dressed in different clothes?
Response: In my article, I go as far as to say that qualia is the result of coherence that is established between an intelligent agent and the inherent intelligibility of the system it functions in. As far as I can tell (and please correct me if I am wrong), I did not claim that qualia is “intelligence itself” for that indeed would be just another form of an infinite regress. If anything, my argument completely steps away from the homunculus fallacy’s line of thinking. By defining qualia as an ‘experience’ of coherence, we actually take a step away from a self-referential quagmire. Think of this not as the ultimate explanation to the hard-problem of consciousness but more as a gateway to understanding and approaching the problem better.
Question 4: You use the coffee mug example to illustrate coherence. But if one person sees a mug as an art piece and another as a container, is coherence in the mind, in the world, or in the relation between the two? How do you handle multiple, conflicting coherences for the same object?
Response: This is a brilliant question. The answer is that we would define coherence as a culmination of all three, i.e., in the mind, in the world, and in the relationship between the two.
Say for instance, a child grows completely isolated from coffee. He has never heard, seen or read anything with regards to coffee. And on the day that the child turns 12 (an age at which conceptualisation is a norm for the brain), you bring this child into your lab, and you place a coffee mug in front of him. What will the child see? There is a very good chance that the child may conceptualise the coffee mug in a different manner than the way that we conceptualise it. Perhaps the child might see a ‘container’ for liquids or even a ‘holder’ to keep his pocket change in. The intelligence of the child interacts with the inherent intelligibility of the environment, and the conceptualisation -> coherence that emerges as a result, may take a different shape. But eventually, that conceptualisation will evolve the more exposed the child gets to coffee mugs and how people interact with them. The child’s conceptualisation of the coffee mug will merge or become similar to the world around him. But at no point, will the child and the world merge on defining the coffee mug as a “dinosaur” or a “suspension bridge”. Because coherence is a game of two. It requires intelligence in the agent and intelligibility that is inherent within the system.
So is there divergence in coherence? Absolutely. But this divergence always leads to a synthesis of the overall understanding of the universe.
On Self-Definition
Question 5: You invoke Gödel’s incompleteness to argue that intelligence cannot define itself. But Gödel applies to formal mathematical systems. Why should we assume intelligence, which is a biological, emergent, and possibly non‑formal system, is constrained by the same logic? Isn’t that analogy a stretch?
Response: Perhaps what I tried to convey by quoting Gödel could possibly be conveyed better with more explicitly informalised examples. But I do believe that our limit in defining intelligence is constrained by the same logic as that of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems in defining the inherent ‘truth’ of a sufficiently complex arithmetic system. I made a claim in my article that intelligence (of the agent specifically), is a closed and internally consistent system. I understand why this is controversial. Because agentic intelligence, in the biological sense, is a complex adaptive system.
But when I speak of intelligence in the context of coherence, specifically the sort of coherence needed to understand the inherent truth of a system without being able to formally prove it, the only conclusion that I am able to reach is that intelligence has to be an internally consistent system, at least at the level of coherence, even if it is not a formally deterministic system. Otherwise, it cannot be capable of understanding truth without proof. When Gödel mentioned that a sufficiently complex arithmetic system is incomplete, the incompleteness of it comes from the very fact that we understand its truth but are unable to use mathematical deduction to prove it.
How then, is a biologically complex agent able to understand the truth in a system while being limited in his ability to prove it? Such a scenario is only possible when the intelligence that is being deployed by the agent is, on some level, closed and internally consistent. I will however emphasise that this is a hypothesis. It is very much possible that I am misguided in my representation of intelligence as a closed and internally consistent system, even if it is at the level of coherence. It is important to note that just because I claim intelligence as such, does NOT mean that I am putting intelligence in the same bucket as that of formal logically consistent and deterministic systems.
Question 6: You say intelligence is a “closed and internally consistent system.” But human intelligence seems messy and inconsistent. Isn’t your premise of closure and internal consistency already questionable.
Response: It is a very good idea to question this claim and it definitely requires a thorough study. As I stated in my earlier answer, this is a hypothesis. However, it is important to clarify that calling intelligence as closed and internally consistent, does NOT imply that intelligence is a formal system that works algorithmically all the way down, producing deterministic outcomes.
On the Implications
Question 7: You say coherence requires two: an intelligent agent and an inherently intelligible system. But what about phenomena like hallucinations, dreams, or illusions, where coherence is felt but there’s no real “inherent intelligibility” backing it? Doesn’t that undermine your two‑part requirement?
Response: I will answer that with a question. How do we know that hallucinations, dreams and illusions do not have the backing of the inherent intelligibility of the environment?
It takes a desert to see a mirage of an oasis. Dreams are never absolutely novel and require at least some form of representation of the world. And to hallucinate is to experience something that does not exist in the real world, however, those sensory experiences are still sensorially tethered, i.e., hearing a voice, seeing a light, or an entity.
While dreams, hallucinations and illusions may be conceptually novel, they are still rooted in sensory experiences that the brain has adopted from the environment on some level. We are able to imagine a dragon, because we are able to conceptualise a reptile, an aerial animal, and fire together. But reptiles, aerial animals, and fire, are all sensory concepts that are already adopted and established in our minds from the environment that we live in.
We cannot imagine a dragon or a pokemon without the inherent intelligibility of the environment backing it in some form. Therefore, phenomena like dreams, hallucinations, illusions, or even creativity and imagination do not contradict or undermine the two-part requirement for coherence.
Question 8: You position your view against Idealism by saying reality isn’t entirely created in the mind. But isn’t your “inherent intelligibility” perilously close to re‑introducing a metaphysical substrate or some kind of Logos in the world? How do you avoid sliding into theological or Platonic commitments?
Response: I am not afraid of the conversation sliding into a theological or metaphysical substrate as long as it maintains the dignity of what I am building upon. I am not trying to define the rules that govern intelligence. In fact, I am doing the opposite of that. My theory is not theological nor metaphysical at its core. I approach it more from the standpoint of phenomenology with a mix of epistemology. But can my theory be justified from a theological perspective? I am sure that a case can be made as such. However, I do not see such an interpretation of it, as a net-negative for the theory itself.
I will however, explicitly state that platonism completely diverges from the core principles of this theory, and so does the idea of an unchanging Logos maintaining a flux. I find such ideas completely alien to what I am working on. My theory of Mutual Intelligibility & Coherence can be interpreted from many different lenses, including but not limited to epistemology, phenomenology, theology or even metaphysics. I welcome all perspectives as long as they don’t misrepresent the fundamental and salient features of this theory.
Question 9: You conclude qualia result from coherence between agent and system. But coherence is a structural property, not a phenomenological one. How does a structure give rise to the subjective feel of drinking coffee? Aren’t you still leaving the “hard problem” untouched?
Response: I never claimed my theory on coherence to be an absolute answer to the hard-problem as the hard-problem itself can be framed from many different perspectives. However, I am not averse to the notion that structure may give rise to subjectivity. You can say that the human brain is NOT algorithmic all the way down. Sure. But does that imply that the human brain is absolutely unstructured? No.
Qualia, therefore, can be a phenomenological experience rooted in coherence. The question then becomes, not if coherence is a structural property, but what form of structural property? As I said in my previous answers, just because intelligence is internally consistent, does not imply that intelligence is absolutely algorithmic or deterministic all the way down. I know that this may come off as a bit ambiguous and it is. But we have to see intelligence in a different light, beyond our binary understanding of formal vs informal systems.
Question 10: You say intelligence cannot define itself in its completeness. Then how are you able to make the claim at all? Isn’t the very act of asserting this thesis a contradiction, using intelligence to define the limits of intelligence?
Response: No, absolutely not. There is NO contradiction. In fact, the very claim that I make, i.e., intelligence cannot be defined in its completeness, is by the virtue of me being an agent within the system and not an observer outside of it. If I had the ability to observe the system in its entirety, then I would be able to define the system in its entirety.
To say instead, that ‘reality is completely created in our minds’ as the idealists do, is to me, a contradiction of the system. Using my agentic intelligence, I can go only as far as to say that my definition of intelligence has limits which is exactly what my theory states and nothing more. It is only by having agentic intelligence, can the limitations of defining the contours of intelligence itself, become self-evident to us.