Does the Mind have a Language of its Own?

Exploring Jerry Fodor's Language of Thought Hypothesis

In the previous weeks, we have taken deep dives into the linguistic theories of Noam Chomsky and Ray Jackendoff. I mentioned the name of Jerry Fodor heavily throughout those articles. The reason being that it is nearly impossible to talk about language and cognition without discussing Fodor’s theory of mental language. So I found it only fitting to dedicate an article to deconstructing and understanding this theory. I hope this benefits you as much as it did me.

Fodor's theory of mental language, or as he famously termed it, 'Mentalese', offers a provocative and compelling framework for understanding the nature of thought itself.

Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) is a theory that posits the existence of an innate mental language. This hypothesis tries to bridge the gap between the abstract world of mental phenomena and the empirical world of neuroscience and psychology.

I will discuss the historical and conceptual foundations that paved the way for Fodor's theory, outlining its evolution and contextualising it within the broader landscape of cognitive science. The core of my inquiry will focus on understanding the intricacies of the Language of Thought Hypothesis, examining its syntactic and semantic structures, and understanding its proposition of the mind as a computational system.

Artwork - Mental Language

Historical and Conceptual Foundations

The notion of a mental language is not an invention of the late twentieth century but rather has its roots deeply embedded in the philosophical inquiries of thought and cognition that date back centuries.

The concept of a 'language of the mind' has been a subject of philosophical debate since the times of Plato and Aristotle, who grappled with the nature of thought and its relation to language. This debate was furthered by thinkers like Descartes and Leibniz, who pondered over the existence of a universal language that underlies all human thought.

However, it was not until the advent of modern linguistics and cognitive science that these philosophical musings began to take a more concrete form. The works of linguists such as Noam Chomsky, with his theory of generative grammar, laid the groundwork by suggesting that the structure of language is innately determined by the human brain. This idea of an innate language capacity set the stage for Fodor’s groundbreaking hypothesis.

My interest in Fodor's work is rooted in how he synthesised these historical perspectives with contemporary scientific insights. Fodor's entry into the discourse was marked by a bold proposition - not only is language innate to the human mind, but thought itself operates in a language-like structure. I explored this idea in great depth in one of my earlier articles this year, titled, “I am…..Am I?” You can check the back catalog and read through that article after finishing this one.

Fodor was not the first to propose that thought might have a language-like structure, but his unique contribution was in detailing this structure and embedding it within a computational framework of the mind.

Moreover, the prelude to Fodor's theory was marked by significant developments in the philosophy of mind, particularly the mind-body problem. The question of how mental states relate to physical processes in the brain has been a central puzzle. Fodor's theory appeared as a bridge that could potentially connect the abstract realm of mental phenomena with the physicalist explanations of neuroscience.

Fodor’s Theory of Mental Language

Fodor's Language of Thought Hypothesis posits that thought processes are, at their core, linguistic in nature. According to Fodor, our minds operate on a set of symbols and rules similar to a language, which he terms 'Mentalese'.

This hypothesis challenges the traditional view that thinking is solely dependent on the language we speak. Instead, it suggests that our cognitive processes are underpinned by an internal language that is innate and universal to all humans. LOTH asserts that this mental language is the medium for all cognitive functions, from perception to decision-making.

Fodor's concept of Mentalese is revolutionary in its proposition that there exists a language that is fundamentally different from spoken languages like English, Norwegian, or Mandarin. Mentalese, as Fodor describes it, is composed of a series of mental representations that have a syntactic and semantic structure. These representations are not words or sentences as we know them but rather complex symbols that the mind uses to construct and manipulate thoughts. This language is not learned from the environment but is an innate feature of the human cognitive architecture.

Fodor suggests that this mental language has its own syntax and semantics. The syntax of Mentalese refers to the rules that govern how symbols in this language can be combined. It's a set of principles that dictates the formation of complex thoughts from simpler components.

The semantic aspect of Mentalese, on the other hand, pertains to the meaning of these mental symbols and how they correspond to the external world. Fodor argues that each symbol in Mentalese has a causal relationship with the objects or concepts it represents, making thought a process deeply rooted in the interaction between mental representations and the world.

The idea of a mental language that operates independently of spoken language challenges our fundamental understanding of thought processes. It prompts us to consider the possibility that the way we think is governed by an internal structure that is both universal and innate. Fodor’s theory, with its bold assertions and intricate details, offers a compelling framework for understanding the nature of human cognition.

Computational Theory of Mind

Fodor’s adoption of the computational perspective posits that cognitive processes are similar to computational operations. In this view, the mind is conceptualized as an information processor, where mental states are computational states. This analogy to computational systems allows for the dissection of mental processes into more granular, rule-based operations. Fodor argues that just as a computer operates on symbols based on a set of rules, so does the human mind operate on mental representations (symbols in Mentalese) according to a syntactic structure.

These representations are the constituents of Mentalese, serving as the symbols that the mind manipulates. In Fodor's view, mental processes are essentially computations that involve these representations. For example, when one is engaging in problem-solving, the mind is computationally operating on these symbols, combining and recombining them according to syntactic rules, to arrive at a solution. This perspective suggests that understanding thought requires an understanding of these mental representations and the computational rules that govern them.

The adoption of a computational perspective on the mind has profound implications. It provides a framework for understanding a range of cognitive phenomena, from basic perceptual processes to complex reasoning and language processing. Furthermore, it offers a potential solution to the mind-body problem, by conceptualizing mental processes in terms of information processing, a concept that is ostensibly reconcilable with physicalist views of the brain.

Some Thoughts

Finally, I would like to end this article by sharing some of my thoughts on this subject. You can feel free to skip this section although I would much appreciate it if you took the time to read through this and share with me, your own views on the matter.

Fodor postulated that our cognitive processes are underpinned by a language-like structure, a universal, innate syntactic medium that facilitates thought.

Firstly, the very notion of an innate, universal mental language raises significant questions. Fodor argues for a language of thought that is independent of the languages we learn and speak. However, the diversity of human languages and thought processes observed across different cultures and individuals seems to challenge the idea of a uniform, innate mental language.

Moreover, there's the issue of the theory's neurological plausibility. Fodor suggests that thoughts are composed of syntactic structures similar to sentences. Yet, neuro-scientific research has not conclusively identified structures in the brain that could embody these syntactic representations. The brain's workings, as we currently understand them, appear more distributed and less language-like than Fodor's theory would suggest.

Another critical point revolves around the theory's treatment of concepts. Fodor posits that concepts are innate and that we have a mental lexicon of sorts, pre-equipped with a vast array of these concepts. This perspective underestimates the role of environmental and cultural factors in shaping our conceptual repertoire. The idea that complex concepts, such as 'justice' or 'democracy,' are innately pre-formed in our minds seems overly simplistic and disregards the influence of learning and experience.

But as I have said in my previous articles, the theories of Fodor, Chomsky, Jackendoff and others are like rivers originating at different places and taking different routes to ultimately merge into the same sea. I think the idea that human capacity for language is at the helm of the definition of consciousness, seems to resonate through all these theories of language.

Fodor’s theory may have attempted to oversimplify certain aspects of cognition. But that alone is not enough to disregard the hypothesis. I feel compelled to acknowledge some of its more salient features that seem to tie well with multiple other theories.